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we had officially declared that we would not
allow any UN observers on our territory.
Until a certain time we will have to
stick to this “maximum program” and seek
ways of achieving an honorable agreement
which could be reached only if we receive
from the USA absolute guarantees of our
security.
According to Dorticos, no Kennedy
statements could be trusted inasmuch as
even now the piratical flights over Cuban
territory were occurring and this was done
not without Kennedy’s knowledge.
Dorticos considers that the Americans,
probably, will not stop at our consent to dis-
mantle bases of special weapons and will
demand additional concessions, in particu-
lar, the withdrawal of all the [Soviet] mili-
tary units.
He also showed concern about possible
solution of the question of the remaining in
Cuba of our military specialists and the de-
fensive weapons at their disposal, attached
for the defense of military objectives.
Dorticos didn’t say it openly, but per-
mitted me to understand that the Cubans
were not happy with our decision [to remove
the missiles under UN inspection] under-
taken without previously consulting them.
I told them that the small delay [in pro-
viding] the letter [from Khrushchev to
Kennedy] was due to merely technical rea-
sons (enciphering, transmission, translation)
and made the assumption that insofar as the
Cuban comrades had several times informed
Moscow about the inevitability of [U.S.]
intervention and bombings, probably, some
quick and operational actions were needed,
so there was no time for coordinations.
Dorticos agreed.
After my visit to Dorticos, Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez came to see me (he was
informed by Dorticos about the content of
the letter from N.S. Khrushchev to Fidel
Castro) and presented a dismal picture of
incomprehension among the Cuban people
and several leaders of our decision to dis-
mantle the special installations.
He said that a lot of people think that
all our specialists and their weapons would
be withdrawn and they were taking it hard.
According to C.R. Rodriguez, F. Castro
has also reacted very painfully regarding this
decision—and not the content of the deci-
sion itself because he considered it to be
advantageous for mankind and the Cuban
people—but the procedure of its adoption—
without a previous consultation.
Particularly, he said, Dorticos had a
presentiment that Castro’s dissatisfaction
would be caused by the phrase that the text
of the response to Kennedy was being trans-
mitted by radio.
C.R. Rodriguez explained that F.
Castro was defending our decision in con-
versations with the Cuban leaders, trying to
convince them that its results would be seen
later, but he had not yet found intelligible
arguments for an electrified people. But the
most important [thing] is that he skeptically
regards Kennedy’s assurances and is con-
vinced that the Americans will go further
and put forward new demands.
In my conversations with Dorticos and
Rodriguez I said that, in my view, the deci-
sion on dismantling those installations did
not interfere with Cuban defensive interests.
It will not only save universal peace and
ensure its strengthening, but this decision
of the Soviet Government will eliminate the
threat of invasion to Cuba and make it more
difficult in the future.
Regarding the issue of the incompre-
hension of this decision by the politically
literate groups of the population, I said that
this phenomenon had to be very short and
the people itself would understand the wis-
dom of the decision and thus raise its politi-
cal maturity. We are confident that Dorticos,
Rodriguez, F. Castro and the majority of the
[Cuban] leaders will understand correctly
our decision and we will find a common lan-
guage with them. Indeed, there are diffi-
culties to explain it to the people, insofar as
it has been excited beyond limits by anti-
American propaganda, but we consider that
there will not be serious consequences and
the nearest future will prove the correctness
of our decision.
28/X/62
A. ALEKSEEV
[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian
Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-
tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro-
vided to CWIHP, and on file at National
Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-
lation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]
Memorandum of Conversation between
Soviet Foreign Ministry A.A. Gromyko
and Cuban Ambassador to the USSR
Carlos Olivares Sanchez,
29 October 1962
29 October 1962
At the request of Olivares Sanchez [I]
received him at 16.00. [4 p.m.]
The Ambassador asked [me] to inform
him about our assessment of the interna-
tional situation created as a result of the na-
val blockade around Cuba, announced by
the USA administration.
[I] Responded to him that we, the So-
viet Government, consider to be a good one
the outcome of the recent events in the Car-
294 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
ibbean. As a result of the efforts undertaken
by the Soviet and Cuban sides there have
been received guarantees on the part of the
USA administration of non-aggression
against the Republic of Cuba, which will be
officially formalized after the end of nego-
tiations with the participation of Mr. U
Thant, Acting UN Secretary General. In our
opinion the result is also a further strength-
ening of the international position of the
Republic of Cuba. Nowadays the Cuban
people is seen even more than before as a
heroic people who has convincingly dem-
onstrated to the whole world its resolute-
ness to defend—arms in hand—the liberty
and independence of its motherland.
Olivares asked about our opinion re-
garding the statement made by Fidel Castro
on October 28 of the current year. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]